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             1            (The following occurred in open court:) 
 
             2            THE HONORABLE JUDGE BECKER:  The panel has 
conferred 
 
             3   and concluded that we are in as good a position to decide 
 
             4   this case now as we will ever be.  There is nothing here 
 
             5   which requires a precedential opinion; the case simply 
 
             6   involves the application of the facts of record to 
settled 
 
             7   principles, so there would be no point to our writing an 
 
             8   opinion for publication.  Accordingly I will now deliver 
the 
 
             9   opinion and judgment of the Court from the bench.  And 
under 
 
            10   our practice this will be sent to a reporter and it will 
be 
 
            11   transcribed and ultimately filed of record in written 
form. 
 
            12            This is an appeal from an order of the District 
 
            13   Court dated August 29th, 2000 which states only that 
"Upon 
 
            14   consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss for 
failure to 
 
            15   comply with court orders compelling discovery, and 
following 
 
            16   telephone conference call in this matter on July 18th, 
2000, 
 
            17   and the expiration of a 30-day extention of time given to 
 
            18   plaintiff at that time, it is hereby ordered that the 
 
            19   defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's 
 
            20   Complaint is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.  
See 
 
            21   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C)." 
 
            22            It is the considered judgment of the panel that 
this 
 
            23   articulation does not satisfy the rigorous standards 
 
            24   established by this Court for sanctions dismissals.  We 
have 
 
            25   made it clear that dismissal with prejudice is an extreme 
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             1   sanction for only the most egregious cases.  See, e.g., 
 
             2   Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 
866 
 
             3   (3rd Cir. 1984).  We have said that "dismissal is a 
drastic 
 
             4   sanction and should be reserved for those cases where 
there 
 
             5   is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the 
 
             6   plaintiff.  Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 
F.2d 
 
             7   339, 342 (3rd Cir. 1982)." 
 
             8            Now, we understand that we review the order of 
the 
 
             9   District Court for abuse of discretion which means that 
our 
 
            10   review is deferential.  But in deciding whether or not a 
 
            11   District Court has abused its discretion, we are guided 
by 
             12   the manner in which the Court balanced the Poulis factor, 
and 
 
            13   whether the record supports its finding.  Poulis laid out 
six 
 
            14   factors to be considered by District Court in determining 
 
            15   whether to dismiss pursuant to Rule 37.  I need not 
burden 
 
            16   the record by listing the six factors, because all of us 
are 
 
            17   familiar with them. 
 
            18            The problem with the order of the District Court 
in 
 
            19   this case is that there has been no articulation by the 
 
            20   District Court of the Poulis factors.  And in similar 
 
            21   situations where there has been no articulation, we have 
 
            22   required a remand to the District Court.  See, e.g., 
Titus v. 
 
            23   Mercedes Benz of North America, an opinion that I 
authored, 
 
            24   695 F.2d 746, 749 and 50 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
 
            25            Judge Joyner is a very able member of the 
District 
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             1   Bench, a man whom we all admire and respect.  But just as 
it 
 
             2   was said of the great Homer, that Homer nods, in this 
case 
 
             3   Judge Joyner nodded and acted a little precipitously.  I 
note 
 
             4   that the panel is not certain that he had all the facts 
 
             5   before him in terms of what plaintiff's counsel had done.  
 
             6   And indeed we have serious doubt that a clear balancing 
of 
 
             7   the Poulis factors would have justified a dismissal, 
 
             8   especially in light of the concession that counsel for 
 
             9   appellee was constrained to make at oral argument this 
 
            10   morning that there really is no information other than 
the 
 
            11   matter of the correct serial number of the bed, to which 
I 
 
            12   will turn in a moment, that the defendant does not now 
have. 
 
            13            Now, we will surely not pin any medals on 
 
            14   plaintiff's counsel for celerity or diligence in getting 
the 
 
            15   material to the defense.  She acted here more like the 
 
            16   tortoise than the hare, but ultimately she did get them 
what 
 
            17   they needed.   
 
            18            With respect to the serial number of the bed, it 
 
            19   appears from our colloquy this morning that 
notwithstanding 
 
            20   the defense remonstration that it has been five years and 
 
            21   that she had all of this time, plaintiff's counsel 
 
            22   represented that they fairly believed to have the correct 
 
            23   serial number and were pursuing the location of the bed 
with 
 
            24   the officials at St. Mary's Hospital, that they had made 
 
            25   requests for information, but were stonewalled and did 
not 
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             1   have an opportunity to pursue it by discovery because the 
 
             2   sanctions dismissal intervened. 
 
             3            We have some doubts under the circumstances as 
to 
 
             4   whether the history of dilitoriness would justify 
sanctions.  
 
             5   There does not appear to us to be willfulness and bad 
faith 
 
             6   on the part of the plaintiff's counsel or real 
responsibility 
 
             7   on the plaintiff.  While we're not sure the Complaint is 
 
             8   meritorious because we don't know what will happen with 
the 
 
             9   bed, we certainly cannot resolve this issue at this 
point. 
 
            10            At all events, if plaintiff fails to locate the 
bed 
 
            11   after discovery, this will be an appropriate matter for 
the 
 
            12   Court to take up on summary judgment. 
 
            13            Accordingly, we conclude that our cases 
constrain us 
 
            14   to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion 
in 
 
            15   ordering the case dismissed as a sanction.  It made no 
 
            16   findings, it did not do the balancing, and it indeed did 
not 
 
            17   conclude that lesser sanctions would better serve the 
 
            18   interests of justice which is another of our 
requirements.  
 
            19   Whether or not lesser sanctions are in order in this case 
is 
 
            20   a matter that we leave to the District Court on remand.  
 
            21   Appellee's counsel has pointed out that some of the cases 
 
            22   that plaintiff has cited and that I have adverted to in 
this 
 
            23   bench opinion were cases where the dismissal was sua 
sponte, 
 
            24   but those opinions nonetheless clearly set forth Circuit 
law 
 
            25   and have been adopted in cases where the dismissal was 
not 
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             1   sua sponte. 
 
             2            Accordingly, the order of the District Court 
will be 
 
             3   reversed and the case remanded to the District Court for 
 
             4   further proceedings.  Costs will be taxed against the 
 
             5   appellee.  This constitutes the opinion and judgment of 
the 
 
             6   Court, but the formal opinion and judgment will follow. 
 
             7            Judge McKee, do you have anything to add or do 
you 
              8   concur in the opinion as delivered? 
 
             9            HONORABLE JUDGE McKEE:  I concur; nothing to 
add. 
 
            10            HONORABLE JUDGE BECKER:  Judge Barry? 
 
            11            HONORABLE JUDGE BARRY:  I concur; nothing to 
add. 
 
            12            HONORABLE JUDGE BECKER:  Very well.   
 
            13            Thank you, and the crier will notify whoever is 
in 
 
            14   charge of processing bench opinions.  Thank you very 
much. 
 
            15            (Conclusion of bench opinion)
                    _________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
     Please file the foregoing Opinion. 
 
                              BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
                                   /s/ Edward R. Becker 
                              Chief Judge
 
